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Is the general consumer interest a source
of legitimacy for healthcare regulation? An analysis
of the Dutch experience
Wolf Sauter 1
Introduction
Economic regulation by independent regulatory authorities is generally legiti-
mised with reference to legal theories based on delegation, (partial) ministerial
responsibility and judicial review, or more recently based on regulatory contracts
and stakeholder representation. None of these models is fully satisfactory. They
all focus either on the relationship between the regulator and the central authority,
or on that of the regulator with the parties that are the subject of regulation looking
at producer interests. In doing so they hardly take into account the ultimate objec-
tive of economic regulation itself : in particular the role of the consumer – and the
consumer interest – generally receives little attention.
The Dutch Healthcare Market Regulation Act (Wmg) 2 creates a new starting
point because it not only introduces the general consumer interest as a legal con-
cept in the context of healthcare liberalisation but as the priority objective of reg-
ulation by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) – albeit based on a motivation
that is largely implicit. This article proposes that an investigation into the interpre-
tation of this concept is warranted, using inter alia an economic approach to regu-
lation (based on the concept of market failure). This extends to asking whether the
consumer interest can provide a source of legitimacy based on the results achieved
in serving the statutory constituency of the regulator : the consumer.
It is proposed here that by applying a legal perspective to the role of the general
consumer interest in the context of demand-driven markets and by making explicit
the underlying economic assumptions, a contribution can be made to the theoreti-
1 Professor of healthcare regulation, Tilburg Centre of Law and Economics (TILEC) and
competition expert, Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa). This text is a revised and edited version
of my inaugural lecture at the University of Tilburg of 6 February 2009. All opinions expressed
here are personal.
2 (Wet marktordening gezondheidszorg) Law of 7 July 2006, Official Journal (Staatsblad) 415.
Last amended 29 december 2008, Official Journal, 606.
















cal foundation of healthcare regulation and of economic regulation more general-
ly, as well as possibly its legitimacy. If this effort is successful it could be elabo-
rated to improve the methods and the priority setting of (independent) regulators.
This approach is not just innovative because it focuses on the general consumer
interest as a legal concept in order to legitimise regulatory supervision, but also as it
draws on economic insights to do so. So far the NZa model of an independent regu-
latory authority for healthcare remains unique in the EU, as appears to be the case
for the explicit focus on the general consumer interest. At the same time both health-
care reform and the consumer interest are already topical research themes. Hence
this approach could be of interest beyond healthcare, and beyond the Dutch context.
The structure of this article is as follows : first, some background is provided on
healthcare regulation in The Netherlands and the role of the general consumer
interest in that context; next, market failure as an argument for economic regula-
tion is discussed; followed by a short overview of behavioural law and economics
issues in the healthcare context. Finally, the legitimacy of healthcare regulation is
discussed; followed by conclusions.
I. BACKGROUND
The main change introduced by the new healthcare system in The Netherlands in
2006 is the central role attributed to demand, and therefore to the consumer as the
source of this demand 3. The consumer is also perceived as requiring a certain
measure of protection. At this point the general economic consensus in favour of
demand-driven markets converges with a broader political trend which sees the
consumer, and consumer protection, as important subjects of public policy in a
market-based society.
The creation of the NZa (likewise in 2006) should also be seen in the context of
the political ambition to replace centralised planning and control by regulated
3 Cfr Health insurance in the Netherlands : the new health insurance system from 2006, ministry
of Health, Welfare and Sport, September 2005 (http ://www.minvws.nl/en/folders/z/health-
insurance-in-the-netherlands-2.asp), 78 p. For a general theoretical treatment of such an
approach to healthcare : J. LE GRAND, The other invisible hand : delivering public services
through choice and competition (Princeton University Press, 2007). For a comparative view on
competition in healthcare : “Improving health care : a dose of competition”, report by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), July 2004 (http ://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/health_care/204694.htm).
















markets 4. However the legislator considered the application of general competi-
tion policy instruments by the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) insufficient,
because the NMa lacked the tools to generate and promote competition in health-
care markets where competition did not yet exist. Hence the creation of the NZa as
a sector-specific regulator forms an alternative both to the classic system of
detailed regulation, and to relying on general competition policy.
A. Tasks of the NZa
The tasks of the NZa are set out in the Wmg and can be summarised in the follow-
ing five categories.
1. Market supervision and market development with respect to the so-called “health-
care triangle” (figure 1). This covers sector-specific competition powers concerning
parties with significant market power (SMP); the power to intervene in (and modi-
fy) agreements between different parties in health markets and in the manner in
which these agreements come about (e.g. imposing auctions); the power to collect
and disseminate information to promote transparency; and monitoring market
developments to advise the Minister for Health and/or inform NZa policy.
FIGURE 1
The “healthcare triangle”
4 “Founding of the health authority”, letter from the minister for Health of 27 May 2005, Lower
House of Parliament, parliamentary documentation 2003-2004, 29 324, no. 3; and idem., “De
Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit : marktmeester in wording. Visie van de minister van Volksgezond-



























2. Tariff and performance regulation – setting prices and budgets and defining
different types of products, enabling transactions between different parties in
healthcare markets.
3. Supervision of the lawful execution by health insurers of the Health Insurance
Act (Zvw), in particular the requirements of the duty of care (obligation to provide
the services constituting the compulsory health insurance package), open enrol-
ment (no risk selection) and community rating (no differentiation in premiums).
4. Supervision of the lawful and effective execution of the Act on Long Term Care
(AWBZ).
5. Advising the Minister for Health, both on request and ex officio, concerning
developments in health markets and related policy requirements (also : “advocacy”).
In other words, as the authority responsible for the functioning of health markets
within the new healthcare system the NZa combines regulatory (rule making),
supervisory, executive, enforcement and advisory (or advocacy) functions.
B. Tensions between rule making, supervision and enforcement
Moreover the NZa is an independent regulatory authority which is not required to
accept instructions in individual cases from the minister for Health. Its decisions
in such individual cases are only subject to judicial scrutiny. Because the NZa
combines the tasks listed above and enjoys the status of independent authority it is
also called a market regulator (in the EU similar market regulators are typically
found in liberalised sectors : e.g. the utilities, such as electronic communications
and energy).
The Dutch government considered it necessary to combine these functions within
the NZa in order to ensure that the NZa could develop a comprehensive view of the
sector. This, in spite of the criticism by the Council of State, that combining rule-
making with supervisory and enforcement powers was undesirable as it would com-
promise the independence of the NZa’s supervision and enforcement functions.
There are also more practical objections against combining supervision and rule-
making functions. Rule-making is based on horizontal discussions concerning dif-
ferent regulatory models or options with the regulated parties, whereas supervi-
sion is based on a vertical relationship of authority that can undermine support for
the rule-making function. Vice versa there is a risk that the vertical relationship
will be overshadowed by horizontal deliberation to a degree that endangers the
















supervisory function. Moreover the vertical relationship must be based on the
application and enforcement of rules that are clear to all concerned in advance –
whereas the horizontal relationship is based instead on a process of “give and
take” that is more discretionary in nature.
Hence, there is an uneasy balance between the more consensual practices that pre-
vail in rule making and the authority function, if combined in a single regulator. In
addition, this can lead to regulatory uncertainty, which is particularly undesirable
in emerging markets (such as healthcare markets). This is because such uncertain-
ty reduces the incentives to invest and/or to enter such markets, to the benefit of
incumbents and the detriment of consumers. Consequently, it will be important to
see whether the NZa manages to establish both its own independence and regula-
tory certainty in the sector.
This gives rise to questions such as the following ones : a) is combining these func-
tions in fact necessary for the effectiveness – a key source of legitimacy for an inde-
pendent regulator – of the NZa? b) How might the NZa enable the Minister for
Health to discharge himself of his accountability to Parliament with regard to super-
vision and enforcement in individual cases – although he cannot give the NZa direct
instructions? c) What standard will the administrative courts apply to judge the dif-
ferent activities of the regulator – in particular in relation to the legality test?
It is too early to answer these questions in detail now. Instead, it is proposed to
investigate whether such institutional issues can usefully be seen through the
prism of the general consumer interest, discussed below.
C. The general consumer interest
Key to the proposed perspective is that the NZa’s legal charter requires it to be
guided in the execution of all of the abovementioned tasks by the general consum-
er interest 5, which it translates in the three public interest dimensions of afforda-
bility, accessibility and quality 6.
5 Article 3, fourth paragraph Wmg. This provision was introduced by Parliamentary amendment,
as were the reference to information asummetry and market power discussed below. Lower
House of Parliament, parliamentary documentation 2005-2006, 30 186, no. 42. Although many
regulators appear to share these objectives de facto they are rarely set out in law and related
directly to the general consumer interest.
6 These three dimensions are derived from the explanatory text to the Health Market Regulation
Act (Wmg), Lower House of Parliament, parliamentary documentation 2004-2005, 30 186,
no. 3, page 2.
















One of the issues to be addressed is whether there is tension between the interest
and/or rights of the individual consumer and the general consumer interest.
Another is whether such tension exists between the consumer interest in the short
term and the long term. In both cases the question is how the regulator would go
about deciding between them. The intuition is that the regulator would choose to
defend the general consumer interest, and for the long term – however in terms of
justifying decisions this also means dealing with increased uncertainty (e.g. in
terms of a cost/benefit analysis).
As is usually the case in general competition policy as well, this indeed
appears to be the case here too. (Different from the consumer perspective of
general competition policy is that this tends to include – and concentrate on –
intermediate producer interests, whereas for the NZa consumers are end-users
c.q. final consumers.) Hence, what is intended as the objective of regulation
by the NZa is not the classical consumer interest in terms of individual con-
sumer rights and protection thereof, but a general economic interest at a more
aggregated level, and in the sense of market participant within the healthcare
triangle 7. This means that promoting the general consumer interest is not pri-
marily intended to promote the interests of consumers directly, but rather to
ensure the market mechanism works effectively, which in turn leads to
improved outcomes for consumers. The market perspective therefore is of
central importance here.
Consistent with this approach, the NZa does not regard the individual consumer as
an interested party with legal standing and the right to appeal (although consumer
and patients’ organisations operating on a nation-wide basis may enjoy this sta-
tus 8). However, even if the NZa is only required to promote the general consumer
interest, this does not yet explain how it will make choices if the different dimen-
sions of the general consumer interest are at odds (e.g. increased affordability may
7 Cfr M. ARMSTRONG, “Interactions between competition and consumer policy”, (2008) Competi-
tion Policy International 97, K.J. CSERES, “The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare
Standard”, (2007) The Competition Law Review 121; R. SMITH and S. KING, “Does competition
law adequately protect consumers”, (2007) European Competition Law Review 412;
N.W. AVERITT and R.H. LANDE, “Consumer sovereignty : a unified theory of antitrust and
consumer protection law”, (1997) Antitrust Law Journal 714.
8 Article 105 second paragraph Wmg. It is remarkable this only applies to decisions where
(individual) “consumers and patients may be interested parties” whereas the original purpose was
to exclude that they could be. How will this provision be interpreted in court? This provision was
also introduced by Parliamentary amendment. Lower House of Parliament, parliamentary
documentation 2005-2006, 30 186, no. 51.
















decrease accessibility and/or quality, and vice versa) 9. There may also be tensions
between the role of consumers as insured persons and as patients receiving care,
i.e. vis-à-vis health insurers and healthcare providers.
These observations give rise to the following questions :
Institutional questions : in the first place the institutional issue arises whether pro-
tecting the general consumer interest may play a legitimising role with respect to
the different functions of the NZa as an independent regulator that were discussed
above – and with respect to the accumulation of these functions, which may com-
pensate for possible objections from a perspective of checks and balances? Does
the statutory objective of the general consumer interest function as a commitment
which increases the credibility of NZa policies with respect to market parties?
Substantive questions : the second theme is how this general consumer interest
may be operationalised in terms of the three public interest dimensions and bal-
anced against the interests of health insurers and providers of care, in more sub-
stantive terms. This will involve looking at e.g. : interest representation, rule-mak-
ing, including interpreting “open norms”, supervision and enforcement.
An important point of reference is the following instruction from the preamble to
the Wmg :
“that it is desirable, considering the information lag of consumers and the imbal-
ance of power between the parties in healthcare, to protect and promote the posi-
tion of the consumer”.
This text, clearly linked with the obligation of the NZa to promote the general con-
sumer interest, marks three important dimensions. The first concerning the relation-
ship between the concepts of the consumer interest and market failure in the econom-
ic context of demand-driven system. The second, concerning the need to compensate
for information lag and market power taking into account the bounded rationality of
the (individual) consumer. The third concerning the legitimacy of the NZa.
Market failure is dealt with first as it can feed into the legal discussion on legiti-
macy, and provides a background to the concept of bounded consumer rationality
that is treated next.
9 It may well be possible to make the necessary comparisons based on QALYs (“quality adjusted
life years”). Cfr D. DRANOVE, What’s your life worth? Health care rationing… Who lives? Who
dies? And Who decides?, FT Prentice Hall, 2003; D.M. CUTLER, Your money or your life. Strong
medicine for America’s healthcare system, Oxford University Press, 2004.
















II. MARKET FAILURE AS AN ARGUMENT FOR ECONOMIC REGULATION
Firstly, the two elements mentioned above, information lag (or information asym-
metry) and imbalance in market power, are two important types of market failure.
In economic terms, existence of market failure is generally required before public
intervention can be justified. At the same time healthcare liberalisation aims to
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of healthcare provision. That cannot be
achieved where healthcare markets fail.
A. Market failure
Market failures in healthcare involve e.g. : a) Market power of certain parties,
such as hospitals enjoying a regional monopoly; b) information asymmetry, such
as doctors who know more about the usefulness of a specific treatment than con-
sumers or insurers; c) adverse selection, such as healthy consumers who do not
want to take out insurance while insurers prefer to refuse consumers who are ill;
d) moral hazard, where third parties are made to bear the cost of behaviour, such
as pharmacists receiving bonuses from the drug industry for providing consumers
with more expensive branded medication rather than less expensive generics with
the same active ingredient.
This illustrates there are multiple sources of market failure in healthcare, so regu-
lation to address them may be justified. The fact that the Wmg explicitly links two
important forms of market failure to public intervention in the consumer interest
underlines the relevance of this perspective.
B. Regulation
Although economic theory does not provide an unequivocal answer to the ques-
tion how regulation should be applied 10, it does provide a framework that facili-
tates making choices when designing regulation. This concerns, e.g. :
– static objectives versus dynamic objectives (which can also be summarised as
short term versus long term objectives), generally with important implications
10 R. BALDWIN and M. CAVE, Understanding regulation : theory, strategy and practice, Oxford
University Press, 1999; A.I. OGUS, Regulation : Legal Form and Economic Theory, Clarendon
Press, 1994; A. SHLEIFER, “Understanding regulation”, (2005) European Financial Management
439.
















for incentives for innovation and investments more generally – for example
when balancing quality and affordability in healthcare markets;
– the consumer surplus versus the producer surplus/total welfare, again with
regard to innovation (involving such questions as allowing the distribution of
dividends versus retaining invested funds in the healthcare sector);
– efficiency versus equity, such as income effects and redistributive questions :
are healthcare providers allowed to retain efficiency gains or are such rents
skimmed off? (and the effects of budgetary measures on efficiency);
– total welfare versus components thereof such as the three distinct dimensions
of the public interest in healthcare : affordability, accessibility and quality.
Here the main question is how to weigh these factors in the event that the
effects on them (positive or negative) differ?;
– primary objectives (welfare) against secondary objectives, such as protecting
smaller providers or new entrants, income policy, regional and local interests
(such as the spatial distribution of facilities – and therefore accessibility).
This short list suffices to illustrate that choices are involved which are also rele-
vant to decisions involving the general consumer interest in healthcare with
respect to the three variables affordability, accessibility and quality. By examining
what the underlying economic choices are, decisions made in relation to the public
interest variables can be better understood, and can be motivated more coherently.
Hence it is suggested that economic theory on regulation and market failure
should be used to interpret the objectives of the Wmg and the way in which the
NZa applies them (in particular concerning information asymmetry and market
power).
III. DEALING WITH BOUNDED CONSUMER RATIONALITY
A. Behavioural law and economics
Behavioural economics teaches us that consumer behaviour is subject to bounded
rationality 11. This is certainly true in healthcare. Consumers hardly investigate the
11 D. KAHNEMAN, “Maps of Bounded Rationality : Psychology for Behavioral Economics” (2003),
American Economic Review 1449; D. KAHNEMAN, and A. TVERSKY (éd), Choices, Values and
Frames, Cambridge University Press, 2000. Many of the insights in this field are derived form
the analysis of financial services (behavioural finance). Cfr A. SHLEIFER, Inefficient Markets : An
















care offered to them, although there are large differences between providers in
terms of quality (including key outcomes such as survival rates, i.e. mortality).
Hence they are likely to spend far more time researching the purchase of a new car
than to find out where they should undergo their heart surgery 12. Admittedly, the
latter is much more difficult given the lack of transparent information, and
because, in The Netherlands, the norm is that all healthcare consumers receive
equal treatment – which ought to mean there are no differences on quality. Reality
however, is different 13. And in view of this fact the demand of consumers for the
information that is necessary to make an informed choice should be greater. The
same is true for less intrusive forms of care and for selecting a health insurance
policy. In the absence of such informed choice the prospects for demand-driven
market-based reform or indeed for public health (and with negative external
effects for society at large) are dire.
Classical economic explanations for these problems such as search costs and
information asymmetry remain relevant but are being supplemented with psycho-
logical factors by behavioural economics. This school of thought is based on the
principle that the classical rational consumer or homo economicus does not exist,
not even at an aggregated level. Consumers tend to overestimate the risk of minor
adverse events and to underestimate more serious dangers (a behavioural charac-
teristic that gave rise to the expression “penny wise and pound foolish”). Once
consumers own a particular item they are likely to value it much more highly than
before they did. They are subject to irrational forms of peer pressure. Meanwhile,
the framing of choices and the default setting have a strong impact on consumer
behaviour (something the Dutch Ministry of Health has tried to exploit in order to
12 Cfr M. GAYNOR, “What do we know about competition and quality in healthcare markets?”,
NBER Working Paper no. 12301, June 2006, http ://www.nber.org/papers/w12301.pdf;
M. GAYNOR, Competition and quality in healthcare markets – Foundations and trends in
microeconomics series, Now Publishers, 2007. M. PORTER and E. OLMSTED-TEISBERG, Redefin-
ing healthcare : creating value-based competition on results, Harvard Business School Press,
2006.
13 In The Netherlands mortality rates for the bundle of treatments that accounts for 80% of hospital
deaths differ by 200% between the best and worst performing participating hospitals (after case-
mix adjustment). Including the non-participating hospitals is believed to increase this difference
to 400%. If figures are disaggregated by treatment the differences in mortality rates are likely to
be higher still. Cfr http ://www.prismant.nl/Kwaliteit_en_Veiligheid/Dossiers/HSMR.
Introduction to Behavioral Finance, Clarendon Lectures, Oxford University Press, 2000. A link
with law and economics is found in R.H. THALER and C.R. SUNSTEIN, Nudge : Improving
decisions about health wealth and happiness, Yale University Press, 2008; C.R. SUNSTEIN (ed),
Behavioral law and economics, Cambridge series on judgment and decision making, Cambridge
University Press, 2000.
















promote organ donation and to obtain permission to use private data in the elec-
tronic patient file). As any marketing professional is aware, exploiting these psy-
chological weaknesses can be turned into a money spinner. In the context of
healthcare the effects of bounded consumer rationality are not just costly, but
painful – or even deadly.
B. The role of intermediaries
One way of solving such problems is for certain parties to adopt the function of
searching for the optimal solutions for others, based on specialisation and/or the
aggregation of interests. By purchasing on a larger scale their experience and mar-
ket power increases, and hence their bargaining position of such intermediaries
vis-à-vis providers of care is strengthened (allowing them to obtain yet better
results).
In a healthcare context this usually involves not just patients’ and consumer
organisations but especially healthcare insurers who can compensate both for the
market power and the information advantages enjoyed by providers of care. In
order to play this role effectively health insurers have to be able to direct their
customers effectively : in order to be credible they have to reward healthcare pro-
viders that perform well by offering them more turnover and therefore more cus-
tomers (while punishing those who perform badly with fewer or no customers).
Moreover they must offer healthcare providers the possibility to specialise and
improve their quality by offering them more consumers with specific ailments.
This too means these consumers will not go elsewhere. The implied logic is that as
long as consumers can choose between different competing healthcare insurers,
these insurers will put pressure on healthcare providers, which in turn, for instance
in the case of hospitals, will put pressure on consultants (medical specialists).
In this manner a “chain” of competitive pressure forms, which requires consumers
to make an independent choice only at the first (and relatively straightforward)
level between different healthcare insurers. This has a positive effect on the infor-
mation lag of consumers, promotes the balance of power in the marketplace for
healthcare services and compensates for (or prevents) “irrational” consumer
behaviour.
















C. Tensions between the individual and general consumer interest
This does beg the question whether selective contracting of preferential providers
of care and/or requiring co-payments or even excluding care outside the network
of preferred providers is regarded 14. There is tension here between, on the one
hand, the right of the individual consumer to freely choose his or her provider of
care and on the other hand effective demand-driven care at a systemic level,
respectively : a tension between the individual and the general consumer inter-
est 15. A comparative problem arises in relation to preferential purchasing policies
of healthcare insurers with respect to generic drugs (to contain costs) and the per-
sonal preferences of individual consumers for more expensive branded drugs with
the same active component. In both cases tension also arises between the three
public dimensions of the general consumer interest – because directing consumers
may improve affordability and/or quality, but it restricts accessibility.
The logic of collective action is also at odds with another general assumption in
economics : that the sum of knowledge that is represented by the decisions of indi-
vidual consumers is larger than that of a central actor (such as the state or of
another collective). From this perspective it is questionable whether the NZa will
be able to predict and compensate for the effects of the bounded rationality of
consumers in its role as regulator. The intuition on this point is that the solution
would be to promote the freedom of choice of consumers between different com-
peting insurers and healthcare providers : making markets work. This is consistent
with the role of the NZa as regulator, i.e. at systemic level.
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF HEALTHCARE REGULATION
Second, the question arises whether it is possible to link the general consumer
interest with the legitimacy of the NZa. In other words : would it be possible to
derive the legitimacy of the NZa from the effectiveness of its actions in terms of
accessibility, affordability and quality, and in the interest of its statutory constitu-
ency – the consumer?
14 For an account of the US experience in this respect cfr D. DRANOVE, The Economic Evolution of
American Healthcare : from Marcus Welby to Managed Care, Princeton University Press, 2002;
and A Dose of Competition, above note 2.
15 In this context economists generally employ the familiar concept of a “veil of ignorance” to
justify choosing the perspective of the general consumer interest. J. RAWLS, A Theory of Justice,
Harvard University Press, 1971.
















A. Different theories on the sources of legitimacy for regulation
In addition to the economic justification for regulation based on the concept of
market failure mentioned above, there are several different legal approaches with
respect to the legitimacy of market supervision by independent regulators 16. In
the first place this can be linked to the (democratically legitimised) legal mandate
of the regulator and/or the indirect parliamentary scrutiny exercised via the (Dutch
legal doctrine of) ministerial responsibility. The idea is that the Minister is
accountable both for his own policy and for general rules made by the regulator.
In this context especially the “open norms” that are often used given the complex-
ity or unpredictability of the subject matter and which the regulator must interpret,
create difficulties. In addition it is not yet clear to what extent the Minister will be
held accountable for supervision and enforcement by the independent regulator in
individual cases. In view of the accountability gap that may arise as a result, judi-
cial review of individual regulatory decisions remains especially important.
A novel perspective on legitimacy of regulation focuses on the notion of a regula-
tory contract, that is concluded between the parties that are subject to regulation
on the one hand, and the regulator on the other. Other recent theories are based on
horizontal regulation, in which case the various stakeholders jointly determine the
meaning and content of open norms : according to this approach, in the final
instance the regulator is even accountable for his actions to the stakeholders. This
in effect leads to a form of “direct democracy” at sector level. Such horizontal
theories of regulation have been gaining ground recently. From the European con-
text, where the (perceived) lack of democratic legitimacy is a well-known prob-
lem, theories of governance are emerging that focus on regulatory procedures as a
possible source of legitimacy, also in relation to self-steering networks of regula-
tors 17.
B. Market power and interest representation
However, the relations between regulators and interest groups are far from neu-
tral. Both political theory and economics teach us that relatively small but concen-
16 Cfr T. PROSSER, “Regulation and social solidarity”, (2006) Journal of Law and Society 364;
T. PROSSER, “Theorising utility regulation”, (1999) Modern Law Review 196; BALDWIN and
CAVE, above note 9.
17 Cfr European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001) 428, O.J., 2001,
C 287/1; G. MAJONE, “The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems”, (1999) West European
Politics 1; M. DE VISSER, Network-based Governance in EC Law, Hart Publishing, 2009.
















trated interests – usually producer interests – are often capable of dominating the
political arena at the expense of much larger but diffuse general interests – such as
the consumer interest 18. As a result so-called “iron triangles” may form between
interest groups, segments of parliament, and the responsible bureaucracy 19.
At the same time, regulators are usually created precisely in those instances where
there are fundamental problems of market power and/or of market structure.
Hence in these cases there are stronger and weaker market participants, and the
former tend to leverage their position of market power – in many cases strength-
ened and fostered by the pre-existing legal framework – at the expense of entrants,
and above all at the expense of consumers. It is this situation that a regulator is
called upon to remedy : even apart from a formal legal mandate to this effect (such
as exists for the NZa). For instance introducing more efficiency also means break-
ing up collusive practices, mitigating market power and promoting market entry.
The regulator is charged with compensating for inequalities resulting from market
power or advantages derived from the market structure. It seems evident that that
for regulators therefore the consumer interest should come first – in the case of the
NZa as an explicit requirement. This is logical in an economic sense (from a per-
spective of effective competition), but also in view of the political theory men-
tioned earlier – and even from the “access to justice” approach in the sociology of
law 20.
C. Focusing on objectives and results
In other words, there is tension between on the one hand the regulatory responsi-
bilities that require wide powers (including rule making powers and open norms)
and on the other had the limited possibilities for democratic legitimation of – and
democratic control over – these powers based on Ministerial responsibility vis-à-
vis Parliament. Attempts to compensate for this by means of transparency, partic-
ipation and consultation as a form of direct democracy appear to be at odds with
18 M. OLSON, The Rise and Decline of Nations : Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social
Rigidities, Yale University Press, Newhaven 1982. Cfr J.E. STIGLITZ, “The Theory of Economic
Regulation”, (1971) Bell Journal of Economics 3; R.A. POSNER, “Theories Of Economic
Regulation”, (1974) Bell Journal of Economics 335.
19 G. MCCONNELL, Private Power and American Democracy, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1966.
20 Seminal : M. GALANTER, “Why the ‘haves’ come out ahead : speculations on the limits of legal
change”, (1974) Law and Society Review. Reprinted in R. COTTERRELL (ed), Law and society,
The international library of essays in law and legal theory 13, Ashgate, Aldershot 1994, 165.
















the requirement that the regulator should confront vested interests and inequality
between market participants (as the result of market power or market structure),
for the benefit of the general consumer interest.
Hence the NZa will not have the choice of filling in the open norms that are part
of its legal framework in the course of deliberation with the parties that are subject
to its regulatory powers. Moreover regulators are in principle created in those
instances where there is political agreement on the basic principles, so these can
legitimately be withdrawn form the realm of direct democratic control : such
norms are not subsequently freely negotiable with market parties. Also, (inde-
pendent) regulators are held accountable in terms of (quantifiable) results – which
in turn are a source of legitimacy and can be expressed in terms of achieving
objectives (e.g. the three dimensions of the general consumer interest). This
requires making these three dimensions comparable and reasoning decisions in
these terms, in relation to the various outputs produced by the regulator : rules,
decisions, opinions and advice (and the court decisions reviewing them).
Conclusions
As has been described above the various current legal theories concerning the
legitimacy of regulation are not satisfactory, in particular for independent regula-
tors. It is proposed that they should be supplemented by economic theories of reg-
ulation based on the concept of market failure. In this context the concept of the
general consumer interest is of particular interest.
This can be seen in the context of healthcare regulation in The Netherlands. For
the NZa, the general consumer interest is not just one among several interests of
the same order of significance as that of other market participants. Instead it is a
statutory priority and therefore determines the approach of the regulator both in
the context of rule-making and in specific cases. This means that the NZa is una-
ble to make its regulation negotiable with market players. Instead it is charged
with redressing the balance of power to the advantage of the consumer and to
compensate for the latter’s information lag.
The NZa has chosen to fill in the abstract notion of the general consumer interest
by means of the three public interest dimensions of affordability, accessibility and
quality. The next step should be quantifying these variables. This is necessary to
allow them to be compared in an objective manner, in particular in those cases
when the effects on one variable are positive, and on another negative. It is expect-
















ed that as a consequence not only (judicial) review of NZa decisions will be facil-
itated but that the NZa will also gain additional legitimacy in terms of obtaining
verifiable results.
Liberalisation and competitive provision of healthcare are at the forefront of the
debate on the relationship between the private and the public spheres, and The
Netherlands has so far gone furthest in healthcare liberalisation in the EU. Devel-
oping the concept of the general consumer interest – fleshing out the dimensions
of quality, accessibility and affordability – will contribute to understanding the
new role of regulation in providing “social services”. Therefore it is expected
these preliminary findings, and directions of future research, may be of interest in
other sectors and other jurisdictions as well.
